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Public Artifacts, Empirical Vulnerability and
Descriptive Metaphysics
Blake Davenport

Abstract: Herein I argue that Amie Thomasson’s account of public artifacts is empirically
vulnerable. I first identify the descriptive claims that feature in Thomasson’s argument and then
outline an experimental framework in which the accuracy of those claims can be evaluated. I
conclude with some brief remarks on the possible implications of my approach for Thomasson’s
account, and some thoughts on whether an experimental approach to evaluating projects in
descriptive metaphysics might be valuable more broadly.
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Introduction
Herein I argue that Amie Thomasson’s account of public artifacts is empirically vulnerable. I
first identify the descriptive claims that feature in Thomasson’s argument and then outline an
experimental framework in which the accuracy of those claims can be evaluated. I conclude with
some brief remarks on the possible implications of my approach for Thomasson’s account, and
some thoughts on whether an experimental approach to evaluating projects in descriptive
metaphysics might be valuable more broadly.
In Public Artifacts, Intentions, and Norms1 Amie Thomasson puts forth a descriptive
account of our conception of artifacts based on our practices surrounding them in everyday life.
Thomasson argues that these practices reveal that we conceive of artifacts as “public”, or as
inherently normative and social. She captures this conception by claiming that artifacts depend on
public norms of regard. So, Thomasson calls these everyday artifacts “public artifacts.”2 Archetypes
of public artifacts include chairs, socks, salad forks and cars inter alia. Notably, her focus is not on
the philosopher or contrastive folk exclusively. Thomasson is interested in the public interaction
with artifacts such that “we”, “our”, and “folk” almost always refer to philosophers and nonphilosophers alike. The relevant artifact practices concern our interactions with artifacts on a daily
basis in a largely non-philosophical manner. E.g., imagine putting on socks, filling up your car with
gas, and eating salad with a salad fork at a nice dinner; not whether the ship of Theseus is a spacetime worm, or whether Lumpl and the statue are identical or just really close friends.
Thomasson’s descriptive account aims to capture the significance of artifacts in our lives.
Artifacts’ significance derives partially from their dependence on norms of regard, which gives
“normative structure” to our lives.3 These norms of regard can govern how the artifact itself is to be
regarded, how those bearing/using the artifact are to behave, and how those bearers/users are to

1

See Thomasson 2014, starting on p. 45.
Ibid. p. 46.
3
See Thomasson 2016, p. 10. This paper is especially useful because it develops some ideas in Thomasson’s
account of public artifacts further. E.g., in Thomasson 2014, p. 60, she considers the practical benefits and
significance of our public conception of artifacts to be captured in the “web of norms” it weaves. This
significance is helpfully expanded upon in Thomasson 2016 as including the ability to structure our lives via
expectations.
2
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be regarded by others.4 A benefit of the resultant normative structure is that it facilitates the
formation of reliable expectations about how people will behave toward artifacts. We infer that
such expectations are in place based on peoples’ reactions to certain behavior. For example,
consider a public artifact like a church. If kids are darting between pews in an attempt to play hideand-seek during a church service, members of the congregation will scold them. One might say we
expect better behavior in a church, even though the kids’ violations are somewhat expected.
However, if the pastor runs underneath your legs to hide from the deacons you might either be too
shocked to scold him or too busy reviving your grandmother. Scolding the kids also enforces the
church norms, as much as it instills them. The pastor’s violation is more surprising because we
expect the church norms to have been instilled in him long ago, and for him to respect them. So
while these violations vary in their degree of predictability they both illustrate how norms help us
form expectations about behavior. Furthermore, these norms are evaluative in the sense that they
are enforced by social sanctions or rebuke.5
Thomasson focuses on these kinds of social interactions between artifacts, the public and
norms of regard. It helps to think of these norms of regard as evaluative and predictive like in the
example above, rather than deontic. While we do enforce norms of regard they are not as strictly
enforced as deontic norms, which might express moral imperatives or truths. Norms of regard for
artifacts connote agreed upon ranges of acceptable behavior for the pragmatic benefit of
structuring our lives. Perhaps it is not, in general, morally wrong that the pastor tried to play hideand-seek during service, but it is wrong-for-church.6
The other central tenet in Thomasson’s account is that artifacts must be intentionally
created. The interplay of creator intentions and norms of regard in our conception of artifacts

4

See Thomasson 2014, p. 53 and her example of uniforms which “impose norms on how they should be
regarded, how the wearer of the uniform is to behave, and how those interacting with the wearer are to regard
them.”
5
See Thomasson 2014, p. 53-5. Also see Thomasson 2016, p. 13, for how expectations about how to act, and
how we might be sanctioned otherwise, plausibly underlie norm compliance.
6
These evaluative norms of regard are neither as universal nor as heavily enforced as deontic norms like “one
should not murder.” This is plausibly due to the comparatively low cost of having a failed expectation for how
people will act in church versus the high cost for wrongly predicting that a hooded figure in a parking garage
will not kill you. These evaluative norms may also not be explicitly known or promulgated, perhaps primarily
being internalized. As such, a primary resource to infer that an evaluative norm is in place is people’s behavior.
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reveals a further social phenomenon. Thomasson calls this phenomenon the ‘general coincidence
of intended and actual regard’ for some public artifact. 7 This coincidence expresses a specific
relationship between artifacts, the public and the creator-intended norms of regard. Thomasson
recognizes the significance of this coincidence and suggests that her account can explain it.
Furthermore, she explicitly considers her account to solve cases of exaptation.8 I argue that
Thomasson’s account should be able to explain coincidence and solve cases of exaptation. I also
argue that what I call the “inferred norm” is the tool she needs to do both.9 However, Thomasson
only implies that the inferred norm is in place, or is a part of our conception of public artifacts.10 I
argue that she relies on it and that without the inferred norm Thomasson will leave an explanatory
gap in her account.11 Luckily, we can test for the presence of the inferred norm, or so I argue. In the
next section I elucidate how the norms of regard and creator intentions feature in Thomasson’s
account. Then I explain why coincidence and exaptation are phenomena that Thomasson should be
able to capture and why she relies on the inferred norm to do so.

Section 1: Norms of regard, creator intentions, coincidence and exaptation
 Section 1.1: The dependence of public artifacts on norms of regard
What does it mean to say that artifacts depend on norms of regard? Thomasson looks to
language in order to understand what a public artifact, like a church, is. The rules of use for the
term “church”, or the conditions in which the term is used, largely determine and reveal what it is
to be a church. These rules of use define the “application conditions” for an artifact term, or when
the term applies to some object. These application conditions reveal what our conception of

7

See Thomasson 2014. p. 53. I often refer to this as merely “coincidence” for simplicity.
Exaptation concerns successfully created artifacts that are regarded by norms other than those intended. Ibid.
9
The inferred norm says that artifacts are to be regarded as intended by their creators. I focus on this in
section two.
10
See Thomasson 2014, p. 53, where she states that the inferred norm explains coincidence. This can even be
read hypothetically as: the inferred norm would explain coincidence if it were in place. I also argue that she
uses the inferred norm to reach her intuitive solution to her thought experiment on exaptation. I consider
Thomasson reliant on the inferred norm to do substantial explanatory work regardless of whether this reliance
is explicit or not.
11
This is not to say that Thomasson cannot find another norm to fill the gap. Rather, the inferred norm is only
candidate that Thomasson identifies and it does the relevant explanatory work very well.
8
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artifacts consists in. Thomasson argues that such application conditions reveal that we make use of
an inherently normative conception of artifacts. Namely, we consider artifacts, and the surrounding
practices, to be bound by norms of regard. So, to be a public artifact is to be intentionally created
as subject to some norms of regard. Without these norms in place, public artifacts would not
exist.12
Artifacts can even be distinguished from one another according to the norms of regard they
are governed by. E.g., salad forks are to be used in dinner parties, to eat salad with, while holding
them at an angle between your middle and ring finger, etc. Plastic forks are to be used in cafeterias
or sack lunches, to eat basically any food with, and to be held casually. To refer to some artifact as a
salad fork is to claim that it was intentionally created as to be regarded by salad fork norms.13 So,
the dependence of artifacts on norms of regard expresses our conception of artifacts on both an
abstract level, as inherently normative objects, and on a concrete level as objects distinguishable by
the particular norms of regard they are governed by. This ability for norms of regard to distinguish
between artifacts further structures our lives by bolstering the ability to form reliable expectations
about artifact behavior.
Although these evaluative norms of regard are less stringent than deontic norms they also
need to be distinguished from mere regularities. Thomasson considers a mere regularity nothing
more than a “descriptive statement about what people happen to do.”14 Regularities describe what
happens whereas norms might also explain why something happens or predict whether it will
happen. So, it is important that artifact behaviors are normative, rather than merely regular, so that
we can structure our lives with greater precision. To see this, take some behavior plausibly ranged
over by a norm and change it into a regularity by removing any social sanctions or rebuke against
misbehavior. E.g., imagine that driving slowly in the leftmost lane of traffic is no longer governed by
rebuke like honking or ‘waving’ (the bird). We can imagine that the result might be more people

12

Here Thomasson takes her well known deflationary stance which ties semantic rules of use for “refer” to the
rules of use for “exists” inter alia. I cannot do her general ontological stance any more justice here, but see
Thomasson 2007 and 2015 for the most robust treatments. See Thomasson 2008 and 2009 for shorter papers
which sum up her stance nicely.
13
See Thomasson 2014, pp. 52-3.
14
So these norms of regard are understood as “genuine norms”, not mere regularities. Ibid p. 53.
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sauntering along in the left lane. Letting slowpokes, like myself, do whatever they please is likely to
ruin the flow of traffic. This may cause wrecks and traffic jams because we will be less likely to
reliably predict the traffic conditions. 15
So, Thomasson is committed to the idea that the behavior constitutive of our artifact
practices, like the classification or regard of some artifact, is normative and not merely regular. If
such behavior were merely regular it would run contrary to our conception of artifacts as
normative. For, our conception of artifacts is derived from our practices surrounding them and is
then used to explain such practices. If Thomasson’s derivative conception of artifacts fails to explain
the behavior is was derived from, or the behavior it applies to, such is evidence that the conception
is inaccurate to say of the folk. This is like checking the solution to a math problem by inputting the
solved variable’s value back into the equation to see if it balances. So, how do creator intentions
play into the mix?

 Section 1.2: The necessity of creator intentions
Thomasson considers it a conceptual truth that all artifacts are the products of intentional
creation and this truth features in her account of public artifacts.16 Creators cannot merely will
artifacts into existence though, they must attain some degree of success. Thomasson uses the idea
of “intentional recognizability” to capture the success conditions for creator intentions when
making public artifacts. 17 Namely, when a creator intends to make a public artifact they must have
a description of the artifact in mind. This description contains some perceptible or structural
features of the artifact and the norms of regard that artifacts like that are to subject to. Then, the
creator intentionally brings about those perceptible or structural features to make the artifact
capable of being recognized as subject to those norms of regard. So, what makes an intention to

15

Most states only have laws that require “slow” vehicles to stay to the right. The discretion is almost solely left
to the motorist to determine whether they are driving slowly. So, it is plausible that primarily social norms
influence the standing rule: slowpokes keep right. See http://www.mit.edu/~jfc/right.html.
16
See Thomasson 2014, p. 46.
17
Ibid. p. 50.
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create a public artifact successful is that the artifact be ‘recognizable as subject to certain norms of
regard’.18
The intentional recognizability of public artifacts functions like a form of communication
between a creator and some agent. Here Thomasson follows Randall Dipert in claiming that
artifacts are inherently social and serve the purpose of communicating a creator’s intention by
prompting a belief in some agent. For public artifacts, this belief is about how the creator intends
the artifact to be regarded. The actual features of an artifact communicate this message from
creator to agent. So, for an artifact to be recognizable as subject to certain norms of regard is for
the artifact to likely prompt a belief in some agent about how the creator intends the artifact to be
regarded. Prompting this belief ultimately depends upon the existence of those public norms of
regard. Without those public norms of regard in place, creators could not successfully communicate
to agents because there would be no stable way to associate artifacts to certain intended regard.
For example, imagine you intend to create a rocking chair. To have a successful intention
your rocking chair should resemble whichever rocking chairs are subject to the norms of regard that
you wish your rocking chair to be subject to. If your intention is successful you will have created a
rocking chair that is recognizable as subject to at least your intended norms of regard. This is
because your rocking chair resembles other rocking chairs also governed by those norms of regard.
Furthermore, if your rocking chair is recognizable, there is a good chance it will actually be
recognized, or will prompt a belief in some agent that corresponds to how you intend your rocking
chair to be regarded. If it is recognized as intended, there is a good chance it will actually be
regarded via the intended rocking chair norms. This connection expresses the coincidence of
intended and actual regard. Thomasson recognizes the significance of this coincidence and the
value of capturing it. 19 It is also a fact of the matter that she thinks the inferred norm is what will

18

Ibid.
See Thomasson, p. 53. Thomasson does not explicitly state that this coincidence is a significant feature of our
conception of artifacts. However, she clearly does consider coincidence significant and as something worth
capturing. This is evidenced by her flagging it and considering the inferred norm to explain it. She also considers
it a virtue of her account that she explains cases of exaptation, which are special cases of the failure for
intended and actual regard to coincide.
19
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capture, or explain, this coincidence.20 Beyond that, Thomasson claims that her account solves
cases of exaptation. I argue that Thomasson flags these phenomena because she needs to be able
to account for both of them.

 Section 1.3: Two important phenomena: the coincidence of intended and
actual regard and cases of exaptation
Coincidence and exaptation are important phenomena for Thomasson because they display
how her theory of public artifacts works in its full capacity, with norms of regard and creator
intentions featuring prominently. 21 However, Thomasson does not explicitly state why she
considers coincidence significant and so I start by explaining why she might. Since Thomasson
explicitly aims to solve cases of exaptation, considers it a virtue of her account that she can do so,
and cases of exaptation have been dealt with perennially by artifact theorists, I do not have to
motivate the significance of exaptation too much. However, I do explain how coincidence and
exaptation are intimately connected and why this connection makes Thomasson’s reliance on the
inferred norm more salient.
The main reason why I think might Thomasson consider the coincidence of intended and
actual regard significant is because it captures the most robust sense of creator success and
plausibly motivates the creation of artifacts in the first place. To see this, imagine your rocking chair
again. According to Thomasson’s account, you succeed in creating your rocking chair if it is
recognizable as subject to at least the rocking chair norms you intend. Like I said above, it may then
be likely that your rocking chair actually gets recognized and regarded in the way in which you
intended it to. When it actually gets recognized and regarded accordingly, this seems to capture a
more robust sense of creator success than mere recognizability. Namely, the prospect of actual

20

Ibid.
Recall that the significance of artifacts lies in the normative structure they give our lives. When evaluating
the significance of explaining coincidence and solving exaptation, it is helpful to think of how doing so would
help to structure our lives. Explaining coincidence plausibly secures the motivation to create a public artifact by
giving creators (and agents) more reliable expectations as to how the resultant artifact will be regarded. Solving
exaptation carries a similar benefit: it enables us to predict how people will classify artifacts in especially tricky
cases, which bears on how we classify artifacts in general.
21
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recognition and regard are likely what motivated you to create the rocking chair in the first place.
You created the rocking chair so it would be sat it in!
Here the question might be why Thomasson does not account for coincidence in the
obvious way, by including actual recognition and regard in her success conditions for creator
intentions. Thomasson gives a clear answer here. She does not do such because seemingly arbitrary
circumstances could produce counter-intuitive results. E.g., imagine your rocking chair that is
perfectly recognizable as subject to the norms you intend it to be subject to. Also imagine that you
locked your rocking chair in your workshop permanently and that it will never be recognized or
regarded in the way in which you intended. In this case, if actual recognition and regard are
components of your intention, then your intention fails and the rocking chair fails to exist as such.
But, there is an obvious sense in which you did create a rocking chair; namely, it is perfectly
recognizable as a rocking chair and if someone broke into your workshop it will probably be
recognized as such (ceteris paribus). Due to cases like this, Thomasson opts to exclude actual
recognition and regard from the success conditions for creator intentions.22
Nevertheless, I think Thomasson considers coincidence important because it represents the
motivating force to create public artifacts. It is plausible that we create public artifacts precisely
because we want them to actually be recognized and regarded in intended ways. Coincidence
secures creator motivation and captures the most robust sense of successful communication from a
creator to an agent, which connotes the social component of our public conception of artifacts.
However, in some cases the recognizability of an artifact is as likely to prompt a belief in
some agent that the artifact is to be subjected to norms of regard (A) as it is to some other norms
of regard (B). These cases occur especially when distinct artifact kinds have similar structural or
perceptible features. In cases like this, the creator intention is still successful; namely, the artifact is
recognizable as subject to the intended norms of regard (A). But, the artifact is also recognizable as

22

However, this need not mean that creators fail to intend for their artifacts to actually be recognized and
regarded in certain ways. These may be the components of another intention the creator has, other than the
literal intention to create a public artifact. If this is right to say of Thomasson then it explains how she can
afford to exclude actual recognition and regard from her success conditions on creator intentions, while still
considering such coincidence an important social phenomenon to capture.
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subject to other norms of regard (B). When an artifact is successfully created like this but is
regarded by non-intended norms (B), coincidence fails to occur. The failure of coincidence in this
way is what marks a case of exaptation. 23 If creators are motivated by the prospect of their
intended regard coinciding with actual regard, then exaptation represents a threat to this
motivation. So, it is important to solve or explain cases of exaptation in a way that preserves this
coincidence between intended and actual regard, such that the motivation to create an artifact can
be preserved. 24 Even without this threat to creator motivation though, cases of exaptation pose
difficult questions that any theory of artifacts should answer to; namely: what plays the lead role in
the classification of an artifact? Is it the actual regard an artifact is subject to, or the regard an
artifact is intended to be subject to?
So Thomasson has independent reasons to solve cases of exaptation. But, exaptation and
the coincidence of intended and actual regard are closely related phenomena. They are so closely
related that a solution to cases of exaptation plausibly explains the general coincidence between
intended and actual regard for public artifacts. Conversely, an explanation of such coincidence also
predicts how people will classify exapted artifacts. So, Thomasson explicitly aims to solve
exaptation and at least implicitly aims to explain coincidence as well. However she accomplishes
these tasks will have to wield our putative conception of artifacts and preserve the role of norms of
regard and creator intentions. Furthermore, the connection between coincidence and exaptation
alludes to a single normative explanation working for both. Looking to the available ways she could
solve cases of exaptation makes this connection clearer.
There are two ways we could classify exapted artifacts: 1) by the actual norms of regard
they are subjected to, or 2) the norms of regard they were intended to be subject to. I argue that
Thomasson relies on it being the case that we classify artifacts according to their intended regard,

23

I deal with Thomasson’s thought experiment on exaptation in the next section. The main point here is the
connection between exaptation and coincidence.
24
Furthermore, there is nothing about our conception of artifacts so far that secures this coincidence. Namely,
just because some agent believes that an artifact was intentionally created for some purpose or regard does
not give a normative explanation for why the agent would go ahead and regard it accordingly. Why should the
creator’s intention matter here? Even holding creator success conditions relative to an intended audience does
not do the trick, especially when intended audiences might have more than one set of norms capable of
ranging over some artifact.
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and that we do so because of the inferred norm. Namely, if we classify artifacts according to their
actual regard, rather than their intended regard, then, prima facie, we are not holding the
intentions of the creator significant in such classificatory practices. For, the intentions of the creator
could have been different than they were and it would have made no difference to how we
classified the exapted artifact (so long as it was still regarded in the same way). Furthermore, if the
actual norms of regard an artifact is subjected to grounds its classification, then there is a plausible
case to be made that we do not consider artifacts to be intentionally created. Namely, if the creator
intention does not weigh more than the actual norms of regard an artifact is subjected to, then
what is to stop us from claiming that non-intentional objects that are subjected to norms of regard
are also artifacts? If we do not classify artifacts according to their intended regard, then what
reason do we have to consider whether the artifact was intentionally created? Specifically, there
does not seem to be a reason that hinges on our normative conception of artifacts. This might cast
doubt on the descriptive accuracy of the conceptual truth that artifacts are intentionally created.
For, our normative conception of artifacts, which supposedly holds intentional creation as essential,
would not explain such classificatory practices. At any rate, the classification of exapted artifacts
according to the actual norms of regard they are subjected to is not conducive to creator intentions
being a central tenet in our conceptions of artifacts. Or, as a weaker claim, the classification of
exapted artifacts via their intended regard is much more conducive to the central tenets of
Thomasson’s account.
If we classify exapted artifacts according to their intended norms of regard, then this
classificatory practice would evidence our conception of artifacts as packaging creator intention
and norms of regard into one significant bundle. Even though the creator intention would weigh
more in the classification of an exapted artifact than the actual norms of regard it is subjected to,
the creator intention would weigh more partly because of the norms of regard which the creator
intended to govern the artifact. In this case, by respecting creator intentions, we are also respecting
the actual norms of regard which would have had to have been in place in order for the creator’s
intention to have been successful in the first place. So, by classifying exapted artifacts via their
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intended regard we are exhibiting a conception of artifacts which holds norms of regard and
creator intentions primary.
Finally, if our classification of exapted artifacts, or our intuitions about such, sides with
intended regard, then it is likely that such a corresponding conception of artifacts will explain the
coincidence of intended and actual regard as well. Namely, if we think that artifacts are to be
classified according to the norms of regard that a creator intended them to be subject to, then we
might also think artifacts are to be treated according to those intended norms of regard. Concisely,
it is likely that we think artifacts are to be regarded according to how we classify them. On the
converse, a normative explanation for why intended regard generally coincides with actual regard
for public artifacts would also govern, or predict, our classificatory behavior surrounding exapted
artifacts. Namely, if we think that artifacts are to be regarded as they are intended to be regarded,
then we might also think that artifacts are to be classified according to their intended regard.
So what kind of normative explanation could Thomasson give that would handle both
coincidence and exaptation? Well, Thomasson is going to want to claim that our normative
conception of artifacts is what explains our classification of exapted artifacts and the general
coincidence of intended and actual regard. But, in order for Thomasson give such an explanation of
these phenomena, there has to be a norm in place which ranges over them. The only norm that
Thomasson identifies as capable is the inferred norm. The inferred norm says that artifacts are to
be regarded as their creator intended them to be regarded. The applicability of the inferred norm
to Thomasson’s account is clear. It not only specifically addresses coincidence, as Thomasson
explicitly states, it also addresses exaptation. Namely, the connection between exaptation and
coincidence suggests that a norm which ranges over coincidence plausibly ranges over exaptation,
and vice versa. So, the inferred norm can solves cases of exaptation and explain the general
coincidence of intended and actual regard in one fell swoop.
Even though the application of the inferred norm to Thomasson’s account is fairly clear,
Thomasson’s relationship with it is a bit slippery. She does not tell us how it will explain
coincidence, even though she claims such. She also does not make explicit how, or whether, she
uses it to solve her thought experiment on exaptation. So, making these applications clear is my
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aim in the next section. Seeing how the inferred norm is poised to do such tidy explanatory work
for Thomasson helps show that she is committed to it. Even if she is only committed implicitly or
hypothetically, it is clear that the inferred norm is something Thomasson’s account relies on in
order to explain coincidence and solve her case of exaptation. I close the section by elucidating how
the inferred norm bears the empirical vulnerability of Thomasson’s account.

Section 2: The inferred norm
I argue that Thomasson needs the inferred norm to be accurately said of the folk so that
she can handle coincidence and exaptation in a way which utilizes our putatively public conception
of artifacts. Otherwise, Thomasson would either have to inaccurately posit the inferred norm
amongst the folk or fail to be able to explain coincidence and solve exaptation. Furthermore,
coincidence and exaptation are exactly the kind of phenomena that Thomasson’s account should
explain.25 Namely, these phenomena concern the exact kind of behavior Thomasson claims to
range over: the interplay of norms of regard and creator intentions. So, just how is the inferred
norm poised to do such tidy explanatory work in Thomasson’s account?
First a bit on the inferred norm. The inferred norm says: ‘artifacts are to be treated as their
creator intended them to be treated.’26 Notice that agents cannot be required to know the actual
intentions of some creator for their behavior to be governed by the inferred norm. When we
recognize some public artifact as intended to be regarded in some way, we are only able to
confidently believe that a creator intended the artifact to be governed by certain norms of regard.
So, the inferred norm is not applying to the actual intention of the creator, from the believer’s
point of view. To say that we are to regard artifacts the way in which they are intended to be
regarded is really saying that we are to regard artifacts the way which respects our most confident
belief for what norms of regard the creator intended the artifact to be governed by.

25

This is not to say Thomasson couldn’t go another route, but that she does not offer one. Furthermore, the
inferred norm does the relevant explanatory work very well, so it is not clear why she would go another route
anyway.
26
The actual quote says: “We can perhaps uncover a deeper norm regarding treatment of all artifacts: that
artifacts are (prima facie) to be treated as their creator intends them to be treated.” Emphasis original. Ibid. p.
53.
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Furthermore, I think the inferred norm is most clearly read as stating that artifacts are only
to be regarded according to our most confident belief for how the creator intended them to be
regarded (ceteris paribus). Since this intended regard can specify how the artifact is to be used, in
what ways, by whom etc. -- there is a sense in which it is only to be used or treated like that.27

 Section 2.1: How the inferred norm explains coincidence
If the inferred norm were a part of our conception of artifacts then it would explain the
general coincidence of intended and actual regard. Imagine that some agent recognizes an artifact
as intended to be subject to certain norms of regard. Further imagine that the creator’s intention
was successful and the agent’s belief accurately corresponds to the intended regard of the artifact.
Assuming the inferred norm is a part of our conception of artifacts, we will then regard the artifact
according to that belief, and so, coincidence occurs.28 Thomasson needs to invoke the inferred
norm to do this explanatory work because she considers our conception of artifacts as inherently
normative; or as characterizes by genuine norms, not explanatorily inadequate regularities.
Furthermore, because the inferred norm ranges over our most confident belief, we can change how
we regard the artifact as new evidence rolls in for how the creator intended the artifact to be
regarded. This continuous tracking of the creator’s actual intention further shores up the likelihood
of coincidence occurring. This tracking is also salient when looking at how the inferred norm might
solve Thomasson’s case of exaptation.

27

Norms of regard do not have to be this specific though and can be fairly general. Furthermore, situations
with conflicting sets of norms only preclude the inferred norm from applying when the conflict between the
norms is overwhelming. I give an example of such an overwhelming conflict in section three.
28
The general distinction between declarative and imperative speech acts may be helpful here. Our public
conception of artifacts holds the behavior surrounding them as normative. So, coincidence should be explained
normatively. If an artifact is like a declarative speech act, then the artifact merely makes the creator’s intended
regard apparent. Even when coincidence occurs, this declarative way of thinking fails to explain such
coincidence. Just because an artifact communicates a creator’s intentions does not explain why we respect
those intentions. Fortunately, the inferred norm does explain exactly that. The inferred norm essentially turns
an artifact from a declarative speech act to an imperative one, by enforcing respect of creator intentions.
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 Section 2.2: How the inferred norm solves cases of exaptation
Exaptation occurs when a public artifact is successfully created with the intention that it be
recognizable as subject to one set of norms, but is in fact subjected to another. Importantly,
Thomasson says in cases like this we classify artifacts according to their intended norms in their
intended contexts, not the actual norms they are subjected to in their actual context. Plausibly,
Thomasson is making this descriptive claim for two reasons: 1) she thinks that our classificatory
practices actually do prioritize intended regard, and 2) she relies on it to being the case that we
classify exapted artifacts according to their intended regard. For reasons discussed in section 1.3,
if exapted artifacts were classified according to their actual regard, then Thomasson would
struggle to capture our actual artifact practices while preserving the central tenets of her
account.
So, what motivates Thomasson to make such a descriptive claim? Here she uses a thought
experiment on exaptation for which she offers an intuitive solution. Thomasson asks us to imagine
chopstick creators from China who expect that Westerners eat like they do. They send chopsticks
west, unaware that Westerners have hair-stick norms rather than chopstick norms. The
Westerners recognize the chopsticks as hair-sticks, and use them like hair-sticks, without knowing
the intention of the Chinese creators.29
Thomasson thinks that the clear intuition here is that these artifacts are chopsticks and not
hair-sticks. Furthermore, she says that in cases like this it is ‘clearly the intended norms which are
used to classify the artifacts, and not the actual norms they were subjected to’.30 Thomasson’s
intuitive solution is supposed to corroborate her descriptive claim: actual regard does not feature,
or feature as strongly as intended regard, in our classification of exapted artifacts. I argue that the
inferred norm is employed within Thomasson’s thought experiment and leads to such a solution.
One way to see the plausibility of this is to reason through her thought experiment while employing
the inferred norm, which I do below. If the result is an intuitive solution that matches Thomasson’s,
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See Thomasson 2014, pp. 53-4.
Ibid. p. 54.
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then such is evidence that the inferred norm is employed within her reasoning or the design of her
thought experiment.
First notice a possible framing effect. Thomasson’s discussion of the inferred norm leads
directly to her thought experiment on exaptation. Within that discussion she states that the
inferred norm explains coincidence, which I have shown to have an intuitive connection to
exaptation. These factors plausibly prime the reader to reason through the thought experiment via
the inferred norm. Will doing so lead to Thomasson’s intuitive solution?
It is interesting first of all, that Thomasson makes the artifacts involved, hair-sticks and
chopsticks, structurally identical. This effectively controls for the inferred norm by holding the
relevant difference between the classificatory options to be whether we respect the intended
regard or actual regard when classifying exapted artifacts. Thomasson reasons that the intended
regard is clearly how we would classify the artifacts here. The inferred norm predicts exactly that
behavior.
Furthermore, Thomasson reasons that the Westerner’s might “dither” over how to classify
the exapted artifacts when presented with evidence for the creator’s actual intention.31 Their
dithering is plausibly due to either the weakening of their original belief for how the creator
intended the artifacts to be regarded, or the resultant competition between two now conflicting
beliefs for such. This reactive dithering shows the continual tracking of the creator’s actual
intention that the inferred norm pushes us towards.32 On top of that, the readers know what the
creator’s intention was. Thomasson stipulates that the creator in fact intended for the artifacts to
be regarded as chopsticks. The reader, privy to this fact, has the most confident belief they could
have for which regard the creator intended the artifact to be subject to. So, assuming the inferred
norm is in place, the reader will classify the artifacts as chopsticks.
If we reason through Thomasson’s thought experiment without thinking of the inferred
norm, it is hard to explain why she thinks her solution is either intuitive or right. What does seem
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Ibid. See her ninth footnote.
Also notice that the Westerners are not rebuked or socially sanctioned. This is because they are not violating
the inferred norm. They are behaving via their most confident belief for how the creator intended the artifact
to be regarded.
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clear is that the inferred norm is needed to explain coincidence and solve exaptation, and does so
very well. For, just because we recognize that an artifact was intentionally created to be regarded
by certain norms does not mean that we will, or explain why we do, classify or regard the artifact
according to that belief. We might think that other factors, like the actual regard of the artifact,
matter more for classification. The inferred norm ranges over just these situations, explaining
coincidence and securing the classification of exapted artifacts via intended, not actual, regard. So,
Thomasson either explicitly relies on the inferred norm to explain coincidence and reason through
exaptation as she does, or apparently should rely on it to do such. 33

 Section 2.3: The empirical vulnerability of the inferred norm
At any rate, it is clear that the inferred norm being accurately said of the folk is valuable to
Thomasson’s account because it allows her to make good on both of her overarching theoretical
aims, namely: 1) to accurately describe our artifact practices and our conception of artifacts, and 2)
to do so in such a way that explains artifacts’ significance in our lives, specifically regarding the
apparent normative structure they provide. So, we can see her project as descriptive at the ground
floor. In order to gauge the descriptive accuracy of her account she can use her derivative artifact
conception to explain the phenomena which give rise to it. Some of the most important
phenomena here are coincidence and how we classify exapted artifacts. If our putatively public
conception of artifacts fails to explain or predict such phenomena, then this would indicate the
descriptive inaccuracy of Thomasson’s account. Since the inferred norm can capture such
phenomena, then testing for it would be especially informative. In order to test for the presence of
the inferred norm we can test for the classificatory behavior of exapted artifacts that it predicts,
and which Thomasson thinks clearly obtain.
One way we can test for such behavior is by presenting people with a vignette like
Thomasson’s thought experiment and then asking them questions like: Did the Westerner’s do
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something wrong? Is the artifact a chopstick or a hair-stick? If you found out that the artifact was
actually intended to be regarded as a chopstick, would you feel as if chopstick use was more
appropriate? Such an experiment would put test subjects in a situation nearly identical to
Thomasson’s readers. Namely, the subjects would also have the relevant knowledge that the
Chinese creator actually intended the artifacts to be chopsticks. If the subjects side with the
Westerners, then such is evidence that their conception of artifacts conflicts with Thomasson’s
account. 34 Namely, they apparently would not think that exapted artifacts are to be classified via
intended regard. If they respond in such ways, which run contrary to what the inferred norm
predicts, then we have reason to doubt that the inferred norm is accurate to say of the folk. In that
case, Thomasson will leave an explanatory gap between her account and phenomena like
coincidence and exaptation.
However, the devil is in the details for an experiment like this. There are a number of
relevant factors which might affect the scenario in important ways or throw off the ability for the
results to bear on peoples’ conception of artifacts. So I will discuss some of these features and how
they might affect an experiment to test for the inferred norm. In doing so, I hope to have
established a working experimental framework that is useful for designing such experiments.35

Section 3: An experimental framework to test Thomasson’s account
Do we classify exapted artifacts based on the intended regard of the artifact or the actual
regard it is subject to? While this question is testable, there are multiple features that need to be
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Considering responses to vignettes to reveal intuitions or concepts is by no means an uncontroversial
position. This claim is the subject of some central debates over whether experimental philosophy is a feasible
enterprise. I discuss this connection to experimental philosophy in section five. Nevertheless, such responses to
a vignette seem as likely to accurately reflect our conception of artifacts as the behavior that Thomasson
otherwise relies on (ceteris paribus). Plus, Thomasson herself uses such responses to bolster her descriptive
claim that we classify exapted artifacts via their intended regard.
35
While I do not fully pitch an experiment to test for the inferred norm herein, I plan to design and conduct
such an experiment in a follow-up project. Nevertheless, Thomasson’s thought experiment on exaptation is
already fairly suitable to be tested and I discuss how certain features of her account might be brought out
experiments on exaptation.
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taken into consideration in order to design an experiment which bears on the presence of inferred
norm.36
 The prompted belief
The most obvious feature that any experiment must have, if seeking to test for the inferred
norm in cases of exaptation, is the ability to prompt a belief in an experimental test subject about
how a creator intends for an artifact to be regarded. The inferred norm cannot be tested if the
subject does not plausibly believe that the artifact is to be regarded in some way or another. The
subject should also be fairly confident that their belief is accurate. It is not arbitrary that
Thomasson gave the readers no room for doubt about the intended regard in her thought
experiment on exaptation.
Furthermore, the test subject’s belief should probably conflict with some stipulated belief
of an experimentally designed agent as to how the creator intended the artifact to be regarded.
Doing this makes it possible to ask the test subject questions about whether the agent was in the
wrong, so to speak. Questions like that will make evaluating the normative force of the inferred
norm relatively easy. It also might be interesting to vary how justified the designed agent is in their
belief. For, if they do not seem to be justified in their apparent belief for how the creator intended
the artifact to be regarded, then we might see more evidence of social rebuke by the test subjects.
The inferred norm plausibly predicts such rebuke because of the continual tracking of the creator
intention that it presses upon us, including the designed agent. So, making a designed agent either
negligent in their belief formation or unreasonably stubborn in the face of counterevidence might
help indicate whether the inferred norm is in place among the test subjects.
 Overwhelming norms
One feature to avoid is the presence of norms which might unintentionally override the
normative pull of the inferred norm. For example, imagine you are appreciating the Mona Lisa at
the Louvre. All of the sudden, a nun runs by screaming for help because her robe is on fire. You
grab the Mona Lisa to beat the fire out of the nun’s robe to save her life. It would not be insightful
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at all, for the inferred norm’s sake, to ask whether you did anything wrong by using the Mona Lisa
like such. The inferred norm fails to govern your actions because it is clearly overwhelmed by the
moral or deontic norms at play.
 Qualitative similarity
A particularly interesting feature is how qualitatively similar the types of artifacts are, like in
Thomasson’s thought experiment with chopsticks and hair-sticks. Chopsticks and hair-sticks are
essentially qualitatively identical types of artifacts. Thomasson most likely uses this feature to
control for the inferred norm. For, when asked to decide how the artifacts are to be classified, the
only intuitive difference between the possible classifications is that one respects the creator
intention, and the other respects the actual regard. This allows for the presence of the inferred
norm to make itself apparent.
Furthermore, because chopsticks and hair-sticks are qualitatively identical, this qualitative
identity plausibly makes the artifacts just as useful in one normative context (chopsticks) as in the
other (hair-sticks). I think this feature points out something interesting; namely, that the perceived
likelihood of exaptation being pragmatically successful might affect how likely the exapting
community is to be socially rebuked, or disagreed with, by the test subjects. I.e., we might test
cases where the exapted artifacts are subjected to a set of norms which renders the artifacts less
useful than they would have been by their intended norms of regard. E.g., imagine that the
chopsticks were explicitly stipulated to have a glossy finish that made it difficult for them to stay
put in peoples’ hair. Such a condition might make the test subjects more likely to rebuke the
exapting community or less likely to classify the artifacts as hair-sticks. On the converse, perhaps
exapting an artifact in a way that makes it more useful might have the opposite effect.
 Nested norms
Nesting one set of norms within another might also test this pragmatic feature. E.g.,
imagine an office space where coworkers routinely make works of art for one another to be
displayed around the office. Pretty much everyone enjoys and partakes in this practice and they do
not take kindly to people disrespecting the office artwork by throwing it away, carelessly damaging
it, and even not displaying it, etc. I.e., imagine that there are some evaluative norms of regard in
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this office community for how coworker art is to be regarded. Also imagine that one employee,
Frank, takes a bunch of spare wooden wedges and spends the weekend carving intricate artistic
designs into them. When he presents his wedges on Monday, everyone reacts accordingly; they
appreciate his artwork and regard the wedges by displaying them around their office. On top of
that, they even realize that Frank’s wedges have the added practical benefit of putting an end to
the door-stopper shortage. All of the employees appreciate Frank’s wedges as art and some of
them also use them as doorstoppers (without damaging them or otherwise violating the norms in
place). Is there a correct way to classify artifacts here? Are Frank’s wedges being exapted?
 Intended audiences, multiple norms and creator awareness
The example above makes evident another feature worth considering. What difference
does it make when the intended audience has more than one set of norms which might range over
an artifact? All things being equal, in cases like this we might consider the likelihood for
coincidence to occur at about 50%. This feature, if placed within Thomasson’s thought experiment,
would mean that the Westerner’s would have had chopstick and hair-stick norms of regard. In this
case we just might not consider the creator to be that successful because their artifact is not more
likely to be recognizable via the intended set of norms, rather than some other set of norms. So, in
cases like this, perhaps Thomasson’s account implies we would not consider exaptation
inappropriate because we might effectively blame the creator for the oversight of making artifacts
that were equally suitable to be regarded by multiple sets of norms.37 So, perhaps this suggests
that the perceived degree of creator success positively correlates with the perceived degree of
creator awareness when multiple norms of regard are in play, and affects when we consider the
inferred norm to apply.
On the converse, it might be the case that we think that such an artifact, intentionally
created via one set of norms while the creator is also aware of other norms that equally apply to it,
indicates something like over-success. In these cases perhaps we think that the classification of
exapted artifacts need not hinge on intended regard because the artifact is just as well suited for
37
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Westerners had constituted the intended audience we might have had less clear, or opposite, intuitions for
how to handle the exaptation.

Davenport 23
other norms of regard.38 In this case, we may not consider the creator intention as important as
what the artifact is capable of.
Here we can play with the structural similarity between artifacts to further tease this
feature out. We might expect that as types of artifacts become less and less structurally similar
that exaptation becomes more and more likely to be rebuked (ceteris paribus). This might indicate
that the perceived likelihood of the artifact to be recognizable by one set of norms predominantly,
is a relevant factor in how we treat and classify artifacts.
This is by no means considered to be an exhaustive list of the relevant features for an
experiment that tests for the presence of the inferred norm, and I am probably overlooking some
of the relevant features of these relevant features. Nevertheless, this section has drawn up a
working experimental framework that can get the experimentalists up and running. The features I
have discussed are fairly intertwined and are to be the most valuable to experimental designs that
focus on exaptation and testing for the inferred norm. Nevertheless, they might also be valuable in
their own right and experimented on individually.

Section 4: Implications for Thomasson’s account
Fortunately, by explaining why the inferred norm is important to Thomasson, I have
covered most of the specific implications that testing for the inferred norm may have for
Thomasson’s account. Nevertheless, I will briefly discuss such implications but would then like to
focus on the implications in the bigger picture. Doing so helps to see why my experimental
approach to Thomasson’s account may be valuable more broadly.
An experiment which tests for the presence of the inferred norm, or lack thereof, among
our conception of artifacts can bear on Thomasson’s account in a few ways. If the results of such an
experiment indicate that the inferred norm is not active in our artifact practices, then Thomasson
will not be able to include it within her account. As I have pointed out, Thomasson is plausibly
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committed to the inferred norm to explain coincidence and solve exaptation. Whether this
commitment is explicit, implicit, or merely hypothetical, Thomasson has no other obvious options
to capture such phenomena. So, right where her account is supposed to apply in its fullest would be
where she would leave an explanatory gap.
Results which indicate that the inferred norm is in place will serve to maintain Thomasson’s
descriptive claims for how we classify (exapted) artifacts and will help to elucidate how the inferred
norm explains coincidence. Even results from experiments testing individual features of her
account can yield valuable insight towards its descriptive accuracy.
I have spent much effort explaining how the inferred norm nestles within Thomasson’s
account. Such effort has been well spent but it is important to understand the implications for
Thomasson’s account in the bigger picture as well.
I frequently call Thomasson’s account descriptive. I have Peter Strawson’s distinction
between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics in mind here. Strawson said: “Descriptive
metaphysics is content to describe the actual structure of our thought about the world, revisionary
metaphysics is concerned to produce a better structure”.39 Revisionary metaphysics values our
actual structures of thought to the extent that they indicate where our representation of the world
errs. Descriptive metaphysics values our actual structures of thought for what they might reveal,
without the aim of improving them. I think it is clear that Thomasson falls into the descriptive
metaphysical camp.
However, Beth Preston makes a further distinction between two types of descriptive
metaphysics: the “traditional option” and the “naturalistic social science option.” 40 I call these
“traditional metaphysics” and “social metaphysics” respectively, and focus on the metaphysics of
artifacts. Traditional metaphysicians might investigate our actual practices and attempt to account
for them in theories, but typically while precluding certain ontological commitments from being
empirically vulnerable. E.g., a traditional metaphysician might account for actual folk practices in
their theory of artifacts. However, they might also hold firm to the reality of ‘artifact-kinds’ or the
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stability of the category of ‘artifact’, regardless of what the folk artifact practices indicate. So,
traditional metaphysics is plausibly inadequate to allow for full descriptive accuracy of our
conception of artifacts.41 Nevertheless, Preston considers traditional metaphysics as a step in the
right direction, away from the insularity that revisionary metaphysics enjoys from other
disciplines.42 In order to fully account for our actual conception of artifacts, metaphysicians need to
embrace artifacts’ inherent social nature and allow actual practices to inform ontological
commitments. Social metaphysicians do just that.
Social metaphysicians are willing to structure their ontological commitments to reflect
actual artifact practices. Nevertheless, Preston thinks that in order to fully understand artifacts in
their social environments, it is important to cooperate with other fields of expertise like biology,
anthropology and sociology. Beyond the myriad of research projects in these disciplines that focus
on actual folk practices, some of them even study practices legitimately surrounding artifacts. For
example, some researchers in ethnobiology study various types of domesticates, or domesticated
plants and animals. Namely, they…

…already study the processing and use of plants and animals in foodways and medicine,
and what is in your cooking pot or medicine bottle is clearly artifactual. Perhaps more
pointedly, your cooking pot and medicine bottle are essential to the processing and use of
whatever is in them, so the ethnobiologists can hardly fail to be taking artifacts into their
purview, no matter what.43
Here it seems that integration of social metaphysics into ethnobiology would be mutually
harmonious and beneficial for understanding the role of artifacts in our lives. The social
metaphysician has a legitimate ability to collaborate with other disciplines in this mutually
beneficial way.
I consider Thomasson to being doing social metaphysics for multiple reasons. She aims to
capture the actual artifact practices in place and grounds our conception of artifacts in public
norms of regard. These norms of regard facilitate the communication from an artifact creator to
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some agent, which expresses the inherent sociality of artifacts. Beyond these clearly descriptive
components of her account, Thomasson evens overturns a previous ontological commitment which
held the intentional states of the creator alone as sufficient to create artifacts and categorize them
by. Now she thinks artifacts depend on norms of regard, which means she also holds intentional
states beyond those of the creator as essential to our conception of artifacts.44 Finally, her account
is empirically vulnerable via the inferred norm. These features make it awfully hard to deny that
Thomasson fits the social metaphysical bill.
So, how does this social metaphysical perspective affect the experimental implications for
her account and the ability for my experimental approach to be valuable more broadly? In general,
experimental results might cause Thomasson to change her account to more accurately reflect folk
practices, or may bolster her account as is. In either case, the results are likely to make her account
more, or more obviously, descriptively accurate. Given the connection to other disciplines that
social metaphysics enjoys, such accuracy will not only be valuable to Thomasson; for, the more
accurate Thomasson’s account is the more likely it is to help explain phenomena that other
research projects, like the ethnobiological one above, are focusing on.
These implications for Thomasson’s account, which express how her account might apply
more broadly, show how my experimental approach, if only vicariously, is valuable broadly as well. I
see at least one more way in which an experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics, like
mine, can be valuable more broadly and it is to that which I know turn.

Section 5: Descriptive metaphysics and experimental philosophy
Experimental philosophy, henceforth “x-phi”, might benefit from my experimental
approach to Thomasson’s descriptive metaphysical project in a few ways. Namely, my approach
elucidates the ability of social constructionist accounts in general to integrate x-phi. To make this
clear I first say a bit about x-phi.
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X-phi is primarily the intersection of psychological experimentation and conceptual
analysis.45 The purview of x-phi has typically concerned topics like morality and intentionality, and
Joshua Knobe has conducted well-known experiments on such topics in order to better understand
the relevant folk conceptions. Hereafter, unless explicitly stated otherwise, “folk” is understood in
contrast to philosophers because it is a central aim of x-phi to compare folk concepts to
philosophical concepts. This is considered to be primarily useful for informing the accuracy of
certain philosophical theories. Knobe’s experiments are supposed to show the connection between
folk concepts of intentionality and morality, and how they might differ from philosophical concepts
of such.46 However, his results sparked a debate over the efficacy of x-phi that questions whether
or not x-phi research methods can accurately bear upon folk concepts.47 One specific research
method of x-phi that came under fire is the use of surveys to gather folk intuitions about vignettes.
Certain critiques question whether surveys are a reliable way to get at the corresponding concepts,
which the vignettes are supposed to range over, and whether intuitions are the right kind of results
to try and elicit.48
The critiques leveled against x-phi are numerous and I do not handle any of them in the
depth they deserve because I am not interested in solving the potential problems of x-phi.
However, in general, it is useful to see what kind of criticisms might apply to an experimental
approach in metaphysics. Off the bat, folk intuitions might seem fairly worthless when supposed to
inform metaphysical questions. For, metaphysicians have acquired a great deal of expertise,
especially compared to the folk, in dealing with such esoteric and vexing topics like time, causation,
and consciousness.49 So eliciting folk intuitions about such things is not likely to be informative, and
the folk may even lack the requisite understanding to have intuitions about such things at all.
Furthermore, their responses might either be predictable50 or indicative of a lack of stable concepts
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altogether51, making such research relatively futile. For, if we can already predict what the folk will
say, or if they fail to have a corresponding conception in mind, then comparing their conception to
our own is likely to lack insight.
While I am not interested in solving such problems here, I am interested in how an
experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics might nevertheless benefit x-phi. Namely, while
x-phi has been employed to investigate folk conceptions of morality and intentionality quite
broadly, there has been little integration of x-phi within descriptive metaphysics.52 I think that there
are prima facie reasons for why an experimental approach, like mine, to a descriptive metaphysical
account, like Thomasson’s, might evade some of the critiques pressed against experimental
approaches to metaphysics in general. Namely, Thomasson is focusing on artifacts, which are
robustly social and normative. These features tie the behavior surrounding artifacts to what it is to
be an artifact. Namely, these behaviors evidence our conception of artifacts (now in the inclusive
sense of “our” or “folk”). These constitutive behaviors can include references to artifacts,
classifications of artifacts and the actual regard of artifacts.
Furthermore, I have argued that Thomasson’s account is the kind of descriptive
metaphysics I refer to as “social metaphysics.” This identifies Thomasson’s theoretical methodology
as willing to inform ontological commitments based upon actual folk artifact practices in place. This
metaphysical methodology is plausibly shared by other fields of study, which also focus on folk
practices in order to understand how they relate to various social constructs and our conceptions of
them. Examples of such social constructs include artifacts, gender, race, and those ethnobiological
domesticates referenced above (inter alia). For these fields of study, the relevant constructs depend
upon folk conceptions, intentions, thoughts, intuitions, or what have you. These social constructs
are created through social interactions, sometimes intentionally, and plausibly structure our
everyday lives. So, rather than be insulated from what the folk think, understanding a social

51

See Huebner and Bernstein for discussion here.
Although there has been some integration generally. Bernstein investigates the folk-concept of causation.
See Rose & Schaffer for a study of how the folk concept of teleology affects their intuitions about composition;
and see Korman & Carmichael for a response.
52

Davenport 29
construct like artifacts depends upon understanding what the folk think and preserving/respecting
it.
So, when looked at from this descriptive metaphysical perspective, an experimental
approach seems conducive to accuracy and value, rather than potentially devoid of such. This
descriptive metaphysical perspective is understood as a form of social constructionism. Since other
social constructionist accounts also focus on socially constructed entities like artifacts, the role for
x-phi need not be limited to something like my experimental approach to Thomasson’s account and
may apply more broadly. I am not suggesting that we let x-phi off the hook from responding to the
critiques pressed against it, especially in regards to metaphysics. Rather, I am suggesting that social
constructionist accounts, and specifically descriptive metaphysical ones, might be a useful platform
to structure such responses from.

Conclusion
In conclusion, I have argued that Amie Thomasson’s descriptive account of public artifacts,
and our conception of them as inherently normative and social, is empirically vulnerable. I placed
this vulnerability on the inferred norm, which I have argued is relied upon by Thomasson to account
for such relevant phenomena like the coincidence of intended and actual regard for public artifacts
and the way in which we classify exapted artifacts. These phenomena are just the kind of
phenomena Thomasson’s account should be able to handle and the inferred norm allows her to do
so. I then sketched an experimental framework that discussed relevant features for experiments
testing for the inferred norm. The experimental implications center on making Thomasson’s
account more descriptively accurate. Such an experimental approach builds on the ability of
Thomasson’s account to feature in interdisciplinary discourse and exemplifies Beth Preston’s
naturalistic social science option for descriptive metaphysics. Finally, I showed how such an
experimental approach to descriptive metaphysics might indicate the value of integrating
experimental philosophy into other social constructionist accounts more broadly. In all, Thomasson
is as likely as anyone to appreciate the work done herein, since she is concerned with accurately
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capturing our conception of artifacts. As such, the empirical vulnerability of her account is a
principally good thing.53
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